Obscenity, 1966: The Marriage of Obscenity Per Se and Obscenity Per Quod Henry P. Monaghan* In a widely admired article, Harry Kalven argued that the New York Times case' embodies the "central meaning" of the First Amendment. On his view, in a free, open society, maximum protection must be accorded to "political" speech. 2 He concluded that the right freely to criticize the government must lie at the center of any adequate theory of the First Amendment. 3 It is not so easy to make a comparable claim about the relationship between obscenity and the First Amendment. The Supreme Court's conception of obscenity is partially responsible. While the Court in Roth v. United States (1957) explicitly barred "obscenity" from the protection of the First Amendment, it defined the term so that only a marginal class of writings warranted the label. 4 Obscenity was given enough precision so that obscenity prosecutions were unlikely to result in the loss of much of value, a result which was reinforced by the Court's parallel concern with local enforcement methods-a First Amendment due process, if you will.i In this respect, the 1966 obscenity Assoc E2d 242 (1964) . Moreover, in the free speech context, the Court has vigorously enforced the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. E.g., A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964) ; Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961) . In holding invalid a warrant authorizing a search for books possessed in violation of a Texas anti-subversive statute, the Court, in Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965) , recognized the dose association between the First and I. Obscenity and a "General Theory" of the First Amendment Though others disagree, I think that in terms of result Roth stands as one of the liberal hallmarks in Supreme Court history. The important question there was not whether obscenity would be sheltered by the First Amendment, but rather how broadly that term would be Fourth Amendments, saying that "the constitutional requirement that warrants must particularly describe the 'things to be seized' is to be accorded the most scrupulous ex. actitude when the 'things' are books, and the basis for their seizure is the ideas which they contain." 
E8.] 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
9.] People v. Doubleday & Co., 297 N.Y. 687 (1947) , affd by an equally divided Court, 335 U.S. 848 (1948) defined. It is on this point, I think, that Roth is a liberal bulwark. In an opinion by Mr. Justice Brennan, the Court explicitly rejected the view of The Queen v. Hicklin,' 2 which allowed the obscene character of a book to be judged by the effect of isolated excerpts upon particularly susceptible persons-a standard which would threaten much serious literature. The First Amendment barred such a definition, said Mr. Justice Brennan, because it protects works unless they are "utterly without redeeming social importance." 13 Thus, at a minimum, any book possessing literary, artistic or scientific value could not be classified as obscene, whatever its erotic characteristics. Moreover, Justice Brennan refused to measure obscenity by the impact of isolated passages on the particularly susceptible. Rather, the inquiry must be:
whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest. 14 Soon thereafter Justices Harlan and Stewart added a third ingredient to the constitutional definition of obscenity: books could not be pronounced obscene unless they were patently offensive-"so offensive on their face as to affront community standards of decency." Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion was concurred in only by Mr. Justice Stemart, the remaining justices deciding the case on different grounds. But Mir. Justice Harlan's view quickly became accepted dogma. See, e.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (opinion of Brennan, J.). Later AMr. Justice Harlan elaborated his thesis, arguing that a "community cannot, where liberty of speech and press are at issue, condemn that which it generally tolerates." Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 171 (1959) (concurring opinion) . Since the additional criterion of "patent offensiveness" further restricted the state's power to suppress, it has rightly been viewed as a "liberal" contribution. But Mr. Justice Douglas' admonition in Roth bears repetition:
Any test that turns on what is offensive to the community's standards is too loose, too capricious, too destructive of freedom of expression to be squared with the First Amendment .... This is community censorship in one of its worst forms. It creates a regime where in the battle between the literate and the Philistines, the Philistines are certain to win. 354 U.S. at 512. This is particularly true in the area of sex, because of the double standard the average man holds in this regard. "There are few topics on which the public and the private views of a person are so likely to diverge." Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Su'. Cr. RErv. 1, 45. Accordingly, "The possibility that deliberating jurors would be uncommonly sanctimonious or hypocritical seems quite obvious." United States v. Klaw, supra note 4, at 169.
I find no support for the view recently expressed by the Fifth Circuit in Chemline, Inc. v. City of Grand Prairie, 364 F.2d 721, 727 (5th Cir. 1966) , that "appeal to prurient interests" and "patent offensiveness" are equivalent concepts.
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The crucial result of Roth seems to me beyond contradiction. No serious, complex work may be suppressed as obscene. But result is one thing, and adequacy of opinion quite another. The Court scarcely made an attempt to reconcile governmental power to repress obscenity with a comprehensive theory of the First Amendment. Nor, as a substitute, did it even construct a "special" theory for obscenity adequate to resolve future obscenity problems.
The inadequacy of Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion in Roth becomes evident from its context. When the case was in the court of appeals, 10 Judge Frank, in an elaborate and learned concurring opinion, questioned whether obscenity prosecutions could on principle be reconciled with the First Amendment. He particularly attacked the assumption that obscenity triggered anti-social conduct, and argued that the supporting evidence was far too insubstantial to justify suppression. 1 1 Framed in these terms, the constitutional question presented to the Supreme Court was most difficult: why could speech be repressed where there was no solid basis for believing that it caused immediate harm? This question raises the sharpest problems of the relationship between the legislature and the Court on civil liberties questions. A legislative finding that obscenity is harmful might fairly be inferred from the pervasiveness of obscenity legislation. 
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Obscenity, 1966
The Supreme Court responded that Judge Frank had been asking the wrong questions. Obscenity, wrote Mr. Justice Brennan, is unprotected by the First Amendment not because it is harmful, but because it is worthless:
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importanceunorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion-have the full protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more important interests. But implict in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance. 20 Judge Frank's impressive analysis was thus neatly laid to one side. But Justice Brennan's reply is perhaps a little too tidy. 2 '
In excluding obscenity from the shelter of the First Amendment, Justice Brennan resorted to what Professor Kalven has aptly termed a "two-level" theory of speech 2 2 -certain classes of speech are within the protection of the First Amendment and certain classes are not. Justice Brennan sought to identify obscenity with other excluded classes of speech. He quoted from Mr. Justice Murphy's opinion in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire:2
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been
The amicus briefs of the American Civil Liberties Union have always taken the position that obscenity cannot be suppressed absent a showing of a dear and present danger of actual harm. The Union recognizes that, as a practical matter, its position means no suppression. See, e-g., Brief of American Civil Liberties Union, p. 9 n.11, Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966 503 (1964) . No such end served by repressing speech simply because it lacks redeeming social value. There must be some basis for believing the speech to be harmful, as false advertising is presumably harmful. Accordingly, it could be argued that the Fifth, if not the First, Amendment bars suppression of obscenity. To this analysis, there is, I think, a complete answer. Under familiar due process principles, those challenging an obscenity statute must show that the legislature could not rationally conclude that obscenity directly causes antisocial conduct. E.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) 27 In any event, the classes of speech other than obscenity referred to by Mr. Justice Murphy seem positively harmful. Accordingly, they provide weak scaffolding for any theory that obscenity is beyond the First Amendment simply because it is worthless. Second, the term "without social importance" is imprecise, and seems insufficient to rationalize all the classes of speech which the Court has held fall outside the protection of the First Amendment. Commercial promotion of goods and services is denied First Amendment protection, 28 but no one thinks that commercial speech lacks social value. The reply seems to be that commercial speech plays "no essential part in the exposition of ideas"; and ideas relating to the buying or selling of goods are not "ideas" in the constitutional sense. So the social value test relates not simply to the exchange of ideas, but to the exchange of certain types of ideas, principally those related to the art of self-government.- 9 But the exclusion of speech not related to the exposition of ideas rests on too limited a conception of the purposes of the First Amendment. To be sure, the First Amendment is centrally concerned with protecting the untrammeled flow of political and social ideas. But Mr. Justice Brennan recognized in Roth and subsequent decisions that the First Amendment protects art and literature as well, 3 0 although the "people do not need novels or dramas or paintings or poems because they will be called upon to vote." 3 1 Freedom of expression is, as Professor Emerson notes, necessarily concerned not just with public matters, but with private life, with self-fulfillment as well as self-government.
2
Third, if the First Amendment excludes what is worthless, the standard of review for determining obscenity should be articulated in those terms, and those terms alone. But the Roth test turns on something altogether different-the prurient appeal of the challenged publication. Nowhere did the Roth Court explain how the prurient and social value tests related to one another. The result was that until 1966 it was impossible to say whether social value was a separate criterion, or merely some aspect or other of the prurient appeal standard. Most authorities came to believe that the two categories were independent. 33 [which] does not discriminate between different liberties. It leaves all liberties to compete for men's allegiance in a free field. In that competition the salesman has the same opportunity as the preacher, the scientist, the engineer, the soldier, and the politician .... Gardner, Free Speech in Public Places, 36 B.U.L. REy. 239, 246-47 (1956) .
t29.] See Roth, 354 U.S. at 484: The protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people." See also the materials cited supra note 2.
[ 36 But it accepted a measure of vagueness here that it had refused to tolerate anywhere else in the First Amendment area. 37 The Court recognized that it was not dealing with a simple, colorless problem of "worthless" speech, but with a problem about which there are deep-and-irrational feelings. Its sole response (albeit an important one) was that only materials "utterly without redeeming social importance" could be suppressed. 88 In sum, Roth insulates from prosecution any serious or complex work, and is therefore a contribution of considerable importance. But Roth does not fit obscenity prosecutions within any general theory of ,the First Amendment; the social value test does not provide an adequate ,explanation either historically or on principle. And in no event does ,the social value test explain why speech dealing with sex alone 
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shoulders the burden of showing that it is not worthless. Moreover, ,the Roth approach to obscenity focuses exclusively on the nature of the publication itself. By not addressing itself to such questions as why a distinction should be drawn between public and private obscenity, or between commercial exploitation of sex and the sale of the same material for scientific study, 39 the Court simply postponed to another day problems which cannot be adequately resolved within the simple per se framework of Roth. The 1966 obscenity cases mark a recognition of Roth's inadequacies and the beginnings of a recasting of doctrine. Does the revamped doctrinal structure fit more easily into a comprehensive theory of the First Amendment? Any answer must begin by assessing the possible governmental interests in suppressing obscenity. Probably no single purpose underlies obscenity legislation. Like most legislation, obscenity laws rest on views and policies which are not only inarticulate but imperfectly understood. Nonetheless, three kinds of state policies may be distinguished for the sake of analysis.
The Nuisance Interest
Public sexual conduct may offend community sensibilities, and few, if any, doubt the state's power to prosecute public indecency or public exposure. It has been suggested that obscenity prosecutions vindicate similar interests, that offensive and aggressive marketing of sexually arousing materials is a "nuisance." 40 This analysis has something to commend it, and is reflected in part in the 1966 decisions."' But it hardly explains the pervasive character of obscenity legislation that generally makes no distinction between publicly and privately dis- REv. 289, 298-302 (1951 The Yale Law Journal eminated erotica, or between invited and uninvited commercial exploitation. It is, after all, one thing to prevent a man from being accosted on the public streets by a seller of erotica; it is quite another matter when that man is a customer who enters the seller's bookstore or answers his ad. In this context the nuisance argument is trivial.
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Moreover, a nuisance analysis does not jibe with the Roth per se approach, which focuses simply upon the book itself, not its manner of dissemination.
Anti-Social Conduct
The time-honored rationale for censorship asserts that obscenity triggers anti-social conduct, particularly violent crimes. As Judge Frank observed, this proposition has never found substantial evidentiary support. 43 To be sure, Mr. Justice Clark believes that such evidence does exist, but he concedes that opinion is divided on the point, and an examination of his affirmative sources-which include J. Edgar Hoover and Cardinal Spellman-is unpersuasive. 44 The evidence in favor of a direct, immediate connection between obscenity and criminal behavior is no more compelling now than when Judge Frank wrote his concurrence. Indeed, in the 1966 cases, the United States made no attempt to argue the point, contenting itself to say that opinion is "sharply divided" on the question; 4 the excellent brief for the State of New York disavowed any reliance on the supposed connection. 40 And some argue that obscenity is not only harmless, but it has "redeeming social importance" by providing a harmless escape for sexual frustrations-it dissipates rather than unleashes anti-social acts. 47
Preservation of Character
Finally, the state may seek to prevent the long-range effect of obscenity on character. The argument is not that obscenity generates immediate anti-social conduct, but that, like group libel, it has an The Yale Law Journal that the legislation violates our concepts of separation of church and state as well as freedom of speech. 5 From these premises Professor Henkin concludes that discussion of obscenity has focused on the wrong issues. For him, the issue is substantive due process, not free speech: can the state enforce the morality of the community without showing that this enforcement serves some independent, "utilitarian" aim?5
6 He suggests that it cannot.
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I do not find Professor Henkin's analysis persuasive. It may be conceded that much morals legislation, including obscenity legislation, was not and is not passed for "utilitarian ends," but as Professor Henkin recognizes, "If the challenge had been seriously pressed, some utilitarian reason for these laws might have been found." ' 8 Most, if not all, morals legislation, including that relating to obscenity, can be assigned reasons falling within an accepted "utilitarian" framework. Mr. Henkin's only response is that these reasons "would have been rationalizations and might have been recognized as such." 5 ' 9 This is no answer, unless we are willing to abandon the "minimum rationality" standard of due process cases, 60 and to permit the Court, in the fashion of Lochner v.
New York, 61 to pass on the "real" purposes of the legislation. Moreover, even if we were to structure the question baldly in terms of the state's power to enforce the secular morality, is it not rational for a community to decide to enforce that morality so as to preserve the community's moral cohesiveness? 6 2 Following Mill, some liberals sug- [66.] I do not believe that those who analyzed obscenity in terms of free speech rather than substantive due process erred. To be sure, obscenity, like all "morals" legislation, presents questions of substantive due process. But under traditional conceptions of due process the questions do not seem to me difficult. On the basis of the present evidence, I think that a legislature could rationally believe that obscenity triggers anti-social conduct, both immediately and in the long run, contributes to psychosexual tensions harmful to mental health, and diverts the reader from more socially beneficial concerns. For me, that is the end of the due process argument. Professor Henkin seems to me to be suggesting that the minimum rationality standard of the regulatory cases be abandoned in favor of a standard approaching that obtaining in the First Amendment area. Broadly stated, that standard is a "balancing" one, and, in essence, requires that legislation significantly impinging on First Amendment interests be narrowly drawn to meet the specific evil, and that the evil to be corrected be a substantial one. There are, however, some who believe that this "balancing" test should apply only to so-called "indirect" restrictions on speech and not to "direct" or "pure" speech, the latter being suppressible only upon a showing of dear and present danger. See Black, J., dissenting, in Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 141 (1959) . For our purposes it is unnecessary to determine whether, particularly in view of Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) , the clear and present danger test is at most simply only another version of the balancing test, or whether its real demise is indicated by the fact that it is often not employed even where "direct" restrictions on speech are involved. See Kalven, supra note 2, at 213-14; Mvfills v. Alabama, supra note 3. Suffice it to say here that under any view of the First Amendment there must at least be a "substantial" state interest involved before the First Amendment interest can be suppressed.
I might add that the minimum rationality standard of the regulatory cases seems to have 264 (1966) , a husband and wife were convicted under the federal obscenity statute for mailing negatives and receiving through the mails developed films of each other posing in the nude. Their convictions were vacated by the Supreme Court on the suggestion of the Solicitor General that, as a matter of policy, the statute was enforced only against "repeated offenders." Mr. Justice Stewart, with whom Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas concurred, filed a brief memorandum stating that they "would reverse this conviction not because it violates the policy of the Justice Department but because it violates the Constitution." Id. at 265. Less than a month later the California Supreme Court reversed on statutory grounds a trial court instruction that a jury could find the defendant guilty of possessing obscene materials even if he had prepared the materials without any intent to distribute. In re Klor, 51 Cal. Rptr. 903, 415 P2d 791 (1966). In dicta, the court suggested that a statute making mere possession a crime would be unconstitutional. Id. at 906, 415 P.2d at 794. See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 673 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
If one accepts the traditional minimum rationality standard, I cannot take seriously a notion that either of these convictions if upheld would have violated due process, Nor does any of the judges address himself in those terms to the questions presented. I suspect that Justices Black and Douglas in Redmond grounded their opinions on the view they take of obscenity prosecutions and the First Amendment, particularly since Mr. Justice Black does not recognize a general substantive due process. See Griswold v. Connecticut, supra note 62, at 507 et seq. (dissenting opinion). Mr. Justice Stewart's view probably reflected his belief that the nude photographs were not hard core pornography. The California Supreme Court explicitly stressed First Amendment considerations. It cited Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Roth and relied on Ginzburg for its statement that no "constitutionally punishable conduct appears in the case of an individual who prepares material for his own use or for such personal satisfaction as its creation affords him," and it went on to say:
Nor does such conduct occur if the creator intends to purge the material of any objectionable element before distributing or exhibiting it. To hold otherwise would pose grave technical difficulties for the unconventional artist and would, because of the risk of criminal sanctions, tend to suppress experimental and tentative productions that might become, in finished form, constitutionally protected communication. 51 Cal. Rptr. at 906, 415 P.2d at 794.
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II. The 1966 Decisions

Memoirs v. Massachusetts 9
The Fanny Hill case presented for review an attempt by the Commonwealth to suppress John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure. 70 History seemed to be repeating itself, for the Massachusetts court's determination that Fanny Hill was obscene mirrored the position it adopted in 1821 when first confronted with the book. 71 (There was some movement, however; on this round, three of the seven Justices of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court dissented.) On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed.
The Fanny Hill case was a classic model of the old obscenity proceeding; the sole question was the nature of the book itself, without regard to the conduct of those who published or sold it. As Mr. Justice Brennan noted in writing for himself, the Chief Justice, and Mr. Justice Fortas, neither party had presented evidence on the "manner and form of... publication, advertisement, and distribution." 7 2 In the context, the Supreme Judicial Court's admission that Fanny Hill had a modicum of social value necessitated reversal; the book could not be suppressed, wrote the Justice, unless it were found to be utterly without redeeming social value. 7 3 Given the importance Mr. Justice Brennan seemed to attach to this pronouncement, it is surprising that lie did not go on to consider how much social value Fanny Hill did Under this definition, as elaborated in subsequent cases, three elements must coalesce: it must be established that (a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value. 
The Yale Law Journal
Perhaps the abstractness of the judicial discussion stemmed from the narrow confines of the proffered evidence. The case presented no questions on a crucial part of the obscenity problem-the commercial exploitation of erotica. At this juncture Mr. Justice Brennan first considered, by way of dictum, the possibility that such additional evidence might have been determinative.
It does not necessarily follow from this reversal that a determination that Memoirs is obscene in the constitutional sense would be improper under all circumstances. On the premise, which we have no occasion to assess, that Memoirs has the requisite prurient appeal and is patently offensive, but has only a minimum of social value, the circumstances of production, sale, and publicity are relevant in determining whether or not the publication or distribution of the book is constitutionally protected. Evidence that the book was commercially exploited for the sake of prurient appeal, to the exclusion of all other values, might justify the conclusion that the book was utterly without redeeming social importance. It is not that in such a setting the social value test is relaxed so as to dispense with the requirement that a book be utterly devoid of social value, but rather that, as we elaborate in Ginzburg v. United States, . . . where the purveyor's sole emphasis is on the sexually provocative aspects of his publications, a court could accept his evaluation at its face value. 5
Ginzburg v. United States 6
The idea that the manner in which the book is marketed-its manner of production, distribution and advertising-could be dispositive in a case moved from the level of dictum in Fanny Hill to holding in Ginzburg. Here the defendent was convicted on twenty-eight counts of violating the federal obscenity statute by mailing Eros (a hard-cover Id. at 441-43. His rejection of the social value test as an independent standard is interest ing; he seems to view social value as an ingredient of prurient appeal, which is to be determined by striking a balance between the book's erotic appeal and its "message." id.
at 442-43. In this respect, I think Mr. Justice Clark is clearly in error. See People v.
Bruce, 31 Ill.2d 459, 461, 202 N.E.2d 497, 498 (1964) . Mr. Justice Clark fails to appreciate that the underpinning of Roth was that obscenity could be suppressed only because It was worthless. Accordingly, as Professor Kalven long ago noted: "If the obscene is constitutionally subject to ban because it is worthless, it must follow that the obscene can include only that which is worthless." Kalven, supra note 15, at 13.
Mr. Justice White apparently takes a view similar to that of Mr. Justice Clark, 883 U.S, at 460-62. What conclusion he draws from treating social value as an aspect of prurient appeal is, however, unclear from his brief and somewhat unfocused opinion.
[ The Supreme Court upheld Ginzburg's conviction; speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice Brennan said that in addition to the testimony centering on the books themselves, there was abundant evidence to show that each of the accused publications -was originated or sold as stock in trade of the sordid business of pandering-"the business of purveying textual or graphic matter openly advertised to appeal to the erotic interest of their customers." 7 8
Here was the crucial shift in theory. The language quoted by Justice Brennan is taken from the brief concurring opinion of Chief Justice Warren in Roth. In that opinion the Chief Justice made plain that in his view the "conduct of the defendant is the central issue, not the obscenity of a book or picture." 79 To put it differently, such prosecutions are concerned with the suppression of dirty businesses, not dirty books. The Chief Justice had no doubt that destruction of the business of exploiting erotica lay within the state's power. But, except for a passing bow at the nuisance theory, Mr. Justice Brennan makes no effort whatever to identify the state's interest in curtailing this business. 80 Simply to denounce it as a "sordid business" is not enough."' One suspects that the Court's consistent refusal to face the question of [77.] The federal state is 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964) , which bars use of the mails both to "every obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile article, matter, thing, device, or substance," and to every publication describing where the foregoing may be obtained. See also 18 U.S.C. § § 1462-65. For a comprehensive analysis of federal obscenity legislation see United States v. Klaw, supra note 4, at 160-63.
The verdict and judgment of the trial court are reported at 224 F. In its choice of such prejudicial epithets as "pandering" and "the leer of the sensualist" to describe Ginzburg's activities, the Court seems to be saying that Ginzburg's crime was no more than a function of his personality or character:, that he was a vulgarian, and that therefore he had no right to trade in a market whose delicate and dangerous products must be limited only to gentlemen and scholars. From the foregoing premise, the result in Ginzburg was inevitable. The "leer of the sensualist" permeated Ginzburg's entire operation, particularly his advertising. 8 3 And this evidence, Mr. Justice Brennan concluded, was relevant not only to the issue of redeeming social importance as it had been in the Fanny Hill dictum, but to the issues of prurient interest and patent offensiveness as well.
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At several places in the opinion, the Court indicates that the "variable" or "per quod" factors of production, sale and advertising are to be considered only in "close" cases. 8 5 This illustrates one of the difficulties of Roth: if a book must be "utterly without redeeming social importance" and if one emphasizes "utterly," as Mr. Justice Brennan does in Fanny Hill, 8s it is difficult to imagine how the question of social value vel non can be analyzed in terms of close cases. "Utterly" seems to presuppose that the question is not one for dispute-that a book is not "utterly" beyond the pale unless no reasonable man could fairly conclude that it had social value, and thus "close cases" should be accorded constitutional protection.
Moreover, it is interesting to note what the Court found by way of a close case. Judging by Roth, Eros was not a close case; its "literate," artistic style might have saved it. Indeed, on appeal the government conceded as much. But under the revamped standards that was not enough. Moreover, the trial judge expressly found that only four of the fifteen articles appearing in the volume were obscene,"' and even these findings were by no means incontrovertible. s What Ginzburg [82.] Not until Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra note 15, did the concept of "variable" obscenity or obscenity per quod reappear. In Jacobellis, however, the Chief Justice and Mr.
Justice Clark, dissenting, would have affirmed the conviction of a motion picture exhibitor at least in part upon the ground that the film's advertising rendered the film itself obscene. Id. at 201 n.2. But Mr. Justice Goldberg, concurring, explicitly rejected the notion that "the exaggerated character of the advertising rather than the obscenity of the film is to be the Constitutional criterion." Id. at 198. Moreover, in Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, supra note 15, at 491, Mr. Justice Harlan, in an opinion announcing the judgment of the Court, said:
[N]either with respect to the advertisements nor the magazines themselves, do we -understand the Government to suggest that the "advertising" provisions of [18 U.S.C. 
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Obscenity, 1966 tried to do is, of course, evident. Roth required that the question of obscenity be determined on the basis of the "dominant theme of the book as a whole." Ginzburg sought to invoke that standard on the magazine level and to insulate Eros from condemnation by including within its covers some admittedly protected material, thereby preventing a judgment that, taken as a whole, any volume of Eros was without redeeming social value. On appeal, the United States did not go so far as to argue that on the magazine level the Roth standards should be applied on an article-by-article basis-a position which has much to commend it.8 9 Rather, the government argued that in a publication, like Eros, which is a composite of independent works tied together only by the fact that they all treat sex in some manner, a judgment of obscenity as to the whole may thus be based upon some of its parts-so long as they are significant in light of the whole .... The opposite rule would, on the other hand, privilege obscene material because of its physical connection with non-obscene material. 90 The Court's response to the question of Roth's applicability on the magazine level is, to put it mildly, vague. Mr. Justice Brennan accepted the trial judge's finding that the inclusion of non-obscene material was a "deliberate and studied arrangement... for the purpose of appealing predominantly to prurient interest," and that the record demonstrated that "Eros was created, represented and sold solely as a claimed instrument of . . . sexual stimulation." 9 ' But at this point his opinion suddenly trails off into obscurity:
Petitioners' own expert agreed, correctly we think, that "[filf the object [of a work] is material gain for the creator through an appeal to the sexual curiosity and appetite," the work is pornographic. In other words, by animating sensual detail to give the publication a salacious cast, petitioners reinforced what is conceded by the Government to be an otherwise debatable conclusion. 92 This, of course, is no answer. The case is not "close" simply because the The Yale Law Journal government "concedes" that it is. More importantly, Mr. Justice Brennan does not respond to the argument that the magazine must be judged as a whole, and that four of fifteen articles (themselves "close cases") do not render the book obscene. The Court's sudden attempt to recast its obscenity doctrine in terms of a limited per quod theory raises problems of the sharpest order. As the dissents point out, 8 3 it seems to fly in the face of the federal obscenity statute which apparently assumes an in rem approach-i.e., that the only question is the nature of the book itself. 4 Certainly Congress had not explicitly directed its attention to the possible impact of production and advertising on the question of obscenity. The Court's construction of the federal statute not only redraws it so substantially as to suggest a denial of due process for lack of fair warning, 9 5 but is also inconsistent with First Amendment traditions.
The Court has always insisted that restrictions on speech be embodied in precisely drawn legislation directed at specifically defined evils, 00 and has invalidated statutes containing broad, sweeping language. 0 7 Closer to the point here, the Court has reversed a conviction where a state court has attempted the narrowest "enlargement" of a statute beyond its plain terms. 98 Plainly, the Court's construction of the federal obscenity statute has little in common with these decisions.
Ginzburg is an attempt to preserve the essence of Roth-that no serious work may be proscribed as obscene-and at the same time to permit the states to prosecute the commercial exploiters of erotica. It purports to rationalize this result by treating the commercial exploitation of erotica as relevant in a close case, which case, in turn, is resolved by the defendant's own "evaluation" or "admission" that his Vague laws in any area suffer a constitutional infirmity. When First Amendment rights are involved, we look even more closely lest, under the guise of regulating conduct that is reachable by the police power, freedom of speech or of the press suffer.
[98.] In Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964) , the Court invalidated a conviction under a South Carolina criminal trespass statute forbidding "entry" upon the lands of another after notice from the owner prohibiting entry, which on appeal the state court construed for the first time also to include refusal to leave after notice. Bouie did not advert to First Amendment considerations, but only to the due process requirement of fair warning. But First Amendment considerations were close to the surface, since the case involved "sit-ins" protesting racial discrimination. work is obscene. 9 9 These admissions are generally found in the circumstances of production and marketing. Over and over the Court emphasizes that defendant's "evaluation" of his work discloses that it lacks social value. 100 But this refrain alone cannot harmonize obscenity per se and obscenity per quod. Under Roth, it is hardly self-evident that a book's social value is affected by the circumstances of its production or publicity, 1 01 and to convict a publisher on the strength of his binding "admission" of obscenity is to indulge in the most naked of fictions. It is impossible to see why "admissions" should be binding only in "dose" cases, 102 nor why the "admissions" of a manufacturer should be binding on the First Amendment rights of his potential customers.
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While the Court has abandoned a straight Roth approach, it has still confined pandering evidence to "close cases"-that is, to cases involving books the social value of which is marginal. Thus we end up with the strange marriage of obscenity per se and obscenity per quod. The offspring of this marriage is the following: no serious or complex The sexy advertisement neither adds to nor detracts from the quality of the merchandise being offered for sale. And I do not see how it adds to or detracts one whit from the legality of the book being distributed. A book should stand on its own, irrespective of the reason why it was written or the wiles used in selling it. 383 U.S. at 482. And in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. at 427, he said: "However florid [the book's] cover, whatever the pitch of its advertisements, the contents remain the same."
[102.] The leading exponents of variable obscenity see no reason to confine it to "close" cases:
.
[I]n my judgment censorship should not depend upon the intrinsic nature of the material independent of its audience and method of marketing. Instead, it should depend upon the manner in which it is marketed and the primary audience to which it is sold. In this way constitutional protection can be given to the occasional legitimate distribution of hard-core pornography for scientific purposes, while at the same time censorship of material that is not intrinsically hard-core pornography can be permitted when the manner of marketing and the primary audience to which it is marketed indicate that it is being treated as hardcore pornography-fhat its function in that setting is to nourish erotic fantasies of the sexually immature. For these reasons I believe that obscenity should be a variable concept, depending upon the manner of marketing-the appeal in the marketing-and the nature of the primary audience to which the appeal is made. Lockhart & McClure, supra note 59, at 299.
[103.] Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965), makes dear that potential receivers have First Amendment rights independent of their senders. See id. at 307-08 (Brennan, J., concurring). Yet, as a practical matter, the prosecution of the manufacturer in obscenity cases will foreclose the rights of the receiver as well. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505, 508-09 (1946) .
The Yale Law Journal work may be suppressed as obscene, but a state has the power to suppress the business of manufacturing or distributing offensive erotica. Despite Mr. Justice Brennan's protestations to the contrary, 10 4 Ginzburg does result in some loosening of the social value test. In candor, Roth has proved inadequate and its rationale has been recast.
Mishkin v. New York°5
Like Ginzburg, Edward Mishkin was in the business of manufacturing and distributing erotica. But his business was of a somewhat different character. His books dealt not simply with sex, but with "sick" or aberrational sex. Sex was the focus around which sadistic and masochistic themes were elaborated. These so called "bondage" books can be found in any drugstore and most bookstores. They include such titles as Strange Passions, Hours of Torture, So Firm So Fully Packed, The Violated Wrestler, and Pleasure Parade No. 2. Mr. Mishkin was convicted on the rather staggering total of 141 counts of hiring others to prepare obscene books, possessing them and publishing them, all in violation of the New York criminal obscenity statute. He received a three-year prison term and $12,000 in fines. The Supreme Court affirmed his conviction, three justices dissenting. 100 What was only hinted at in Ginzburg comes clearly to light in Mishkin. Despite the Court's disclaimer, Mishkin's intent was controlling. He sought to engage in the business of pandering, and that can be proscribed, at least where the books involved possess only minimal social value. Once again Justice Brennan wrote for the Court, and his opinion shows the great leeway now permitted the state. He made little reference to questions of advertising or of "admissions." Rather, he treated the various parts of the New York statute as a unitary effort to eliminate the manufacture and distribution of sado-masochis. tic materials, and on that basis sustained the convictions. Justice Brennan said:
Appellant instructed his authors and artists to prepare the books expressly to induce their purchase by persons who would probably be sexually stimulated by them ....
Not A few rationalizations may be offered. Unlike Ginzburg, the books involved in Mishkin did not present a "close" case. They were obscene per se. This analysis is not contradicted by the opinion. But Justice Brennan does not analyze the problem in those terms; he is centrally concerned with Mishkin's conduct, not the status of the books.
Mishkin's argument on appeal was principally restricted to the meaning of "prurient appeal." He made no effort to argue that his collection had social value. Thus, the Court was able to avoid dealing with a question of the most crucial importance: what is the "central meaning" of the social value test? But that question did not escape all notice. Dissenting in Fanny Hill, Mr. Justice White had pickishly inquired in passing why the fact that the books had a market did not demonstrate their social value. 08 But it was left to Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in Mishkin, to lay bare the unexamined premises of the majority: Some of the tracts for which these publishers go to prison concern normal sex, some homosexuality, some masochistic yearning that is probably present in everyone and dominant in some.. .. Why is it unlawful to cater to the needs of this group? They are, to be sure, somewhat offbeat, nonconformist, and odd. But we are not in the realm of criminal conduct, only ideas and tastes.... [W] hy is freedom of the press and expression denied them? Are they to be barred from communicating in symbolisms important to them? When the Court today speaks of "social value," does it mean a "value" to the majority? Why is not a minority "value" cognizable?... If we were wise enough, we might know that communication may have greater therapeutical value than any sermon that those of the "normal" community can ever offer. But if the communication is of value to the masochistic community or to others of the deviant community, how can it be said to be "utterly without any redeeming social importance"? "Redeeming" to whom? 09 Mr. Justice Douglas' questions cannot be brushed aside with the flourish that he misunderstands the social value test-that this test protects only the interest in the exchange of ideas, not other interests however significant. But does purely literary or artistic value qualify for protection? III. Obscenity and The Law: Unfinished Business Plainly, the 1966 obscenity decisions are not the last word on the relationship between obscenity and the First Amendment. Like Roth, the 1966 cases could not reconcile the existence of obscenity prosecutions with a principled general theory of the First Amendment. Indeed, the 1966 decisions merely "adjust" Roth to permit the states considerable latitude in suppressing the commercial exploitation of erotica having minimal social value. Against this general backdrop one must assess some of the important legal problems which still demand resolution.
Evidentiary and Related Problems
The role of the judge in an obscenity prosecution is a critical evidentiary question bearing on the scope of First Amendment protection. The typical obscenity prosecution has been a trial of the book itself, even though in form a proceeding against the distributor or retailer. The earliest trials apparently amounted to no more than a submission of the book to the judge, but recent trials have featured elaborate evidentiary hearings. Fanny Hill illustrates the pattern. The Commonwealth introduced the book and the testimony of one marginally qualified expert. The defense introduced notices by literary critics, and the testimony of professors at Harvard, Brandeis, Williams, and Boston University, each of whom affirmed Fanny Hill's social value. Ginzburg involved an even more extensive hearing along the same lines. The critical question never faced under Roth was the scope of judicial review given records of this character. In the typical case, the trial judge heard the testimony as though he were being given a short course in English literature, but then made up his mind about the book quite independently of the record evidence. In Fanny Hill the amici urged the Massachusetts court to reject this approach and direct the trial judge to dismiss the prosecution so long as the record contained substantial evidence of the book's redeeming social value, unless the judge could conclude that the record testimony was irrational. 11 0 Any other standard, they insisted, would give too narrow a protection to freedom of speech. Their argument is persuasive, and deserves better treatment than it received in last term's decisions.
The substantial evidence approach won support from two of the three dissenting judges in Massachusetts,"' and a subsequent opinion of that court involving Naked Lunch was more favorable. 12 Unfortunately, however, the argument that the judge was bound by the record evidence was not pressed in the Supreme Court. In Ginzburg, the United States did argue, almost in passing, that the judge must make an independent determination on the question of obscenity. 11 3 The decisions, in turn, contain little explicit discussion of this problem. Mr. Justice Harlan indicated that he was aware of and rejected the argument that the judge is bound by the "substantial" record testimony. 1 4 Mr. Justice Douglas reached the opposite conclusion. [111.] Writing for himself and Justice Spiegel, justice Whittemore summarized the evidence in favor of the book, and said:
It is not the court's function to consider whether to agree or disagree with the appraisal of the book by academic witnesses. The controlling circumstance is that the work is evaluated by representative scholars and teachers of English literature as a work of some literary and historical significance notwithstanding its patently pornographic aspects. I construe the concept embodied in the term "social importance" as used by the United States Supreme Court to include the literary and historical field. Hence, I believe that the publication of this book is protected by the First Amendment as expounded in the Supreme Court decisions. 349 Mass. at 75, 206 N.E.2d at 407.
[112.] In Attorney General v. A Book Named "Naked Lunch,"-Mass.-, 218 N.E.2d 571, 571-72 (1966) , the court said:
As to whether the book has any redeeming social value,... it appears that a substantial and intelligent group in the community believes the book to be of some literary significance. Although we are not bound by the opinions of others concerning the book, we cannot ignore the serious acceptance of it by so many persons in the literary community. See also United States v. Klaw, supra note 4, at 170: " [I] 1115.] Id. at 427. t seems to me that the only solution that will full) protect First Amendment values is a holding that, confronted with substantial evidence of social value either on the record or even outside it, the trial court must sustain a First Amendment defense. The suggested standard draws support from-but goes be)yond-the general evidentiary rules governing the role of expert testimony. While the trier of fact may not "arbitrarily disregard all the expert testimony in the record and rely upon his unsubstantiated personal beliefs instead of upon evidence," Alvary v. United States, 302 F.2d 790, 794 (2d Cir. 1962), he may "reject expert testimony and reach a conclusion based upon his]
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The Yale Law Journal While Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion in Ginzburg does not treat the problem directly, it did sustain convictions over considerable record evidence that Eros as a whole, and each of the four questioned articles, had social value. 116 Thus Ginzburg raises the question whether the book's social value must be "self-demonstrating" if pandering evidence is to be irrelevant. But if this is so, then record evidence will be of virtually no significance on the question of social value. In a clear case (where a book has obvious value), supporting evidence is superfluous, while in a "close" case (where social value is not obvious), the book will not be saved by the record testimony if it is being sold by a panderer. In other words, the only cases where record evidence would really be helpful are those where it will probably do no good. But this need not be the practical result of Ginzburg, for the Court did not squarely address itself to the standard by which the trial judge should evaluate the record testimony and, despite its implications, it should not be taken to have settled the point. 117 knowledge, experience, and judgment. However, it must fairly appear from the record that the fact finder had knowledge and experience relative to the subject matter." Cullers v. Comm'r, 237 F.2d 611, 616 (8th Cir. 1965).
I recognize, of course, that the substantial evidence rule is a principle governing judicial review of administrative determination of fact, not judicial findings in criminal trials; and I recognize that at least in federal prosecutions the question of social value is for the judge, not the jury. But I do not see that either of these observations means that the suggested standard raises constitutional difficulties. I do not believe that even the most expansive reading of the "constitutional fact" doctrine of Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), would result in invalidation of the suggested standard as a violation of Article III. Crowell dealt with legislative restrictions on judicial review, not with standards of review asserted to be part and parcel of the Bill of Rights. See generally JAFFE, JUDIcIAL CONTROL OF ADMINIsTRATIVE ACTION 636-56 (1965) . I recognize that, unlike the substantial evidence test in administrative law, see Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951); JAm, supra, at 600-15, the proposed standard would require that the judge look only at the evidence supporting the book. This does not mean, how. ever, that the judge could never fairly conclude that the expert testimony supporting the book was insubstantial. See, e.g., Books, Inc. v. United States, 358 F.2d 935 (1st Cir. 1966) .
[116.] For a summary of this testimony, see Brief for Petitioners, pp. 41-42, Ginzburg V. United States, supra note 7.
[117.] The Court has never addressed itself to the manner in which the trial judge should evaluate the evidence before him. Instead, it has tended to focus on the question of the extent to which it (or any appellate court) is bound by the finding of a lower court or administrative agency that a book is without social value. The Supreme Court has always considered its function to require it to make an independent judqment on the social value question, and in the 1966 cases all the parties agreed that this was its proper role. For a dear exposition of the view see Jacobellis v. The Court has paid even less heed to evidentiary and appellate review problems stemming from the prurient appeal and patent offensiveness criteria. In Ginzburg the United States argued that the Court should independently review social value, but should accept the lower court's determination on pruriency and patent offensiveness unless clearly wrong. 11 8 If adopted, this rule would still leave open difficult evidentiary questions. Must evidence be introduced on prurient appeal or is it a proper subject for judicial notice?" 0 Must patent offensiveness be "so gross as to be self-demonstrating," as Justice Harlan has suggested? 20 To the extent that an obscenity prosecution involves other than "hard-core" pornography, expert testimony on patent offensiveness seems necessary.'-" Certainly the patent offensiveness of Eros cannot fairly be characterized as "self-demonstrating." But if evidence is relevant on the question of national'2 -community standards, what kind of evidence is it?' 23 Can the publisher introduce other books bought and sold in the market place as evidence of what national standards are? 24 What of book reviews, or sociology studies? The Court has not addressed itself to any of these evidentiary questions, or, for that matter, to the proper relation between judge and jury in federal prosecutions. 25 matter of the appropriate community. It now seems to me that only four Justices are definitely committed to the view that national community standards control: Black, Douglas, Brennan and Stewart, JJ. Mr. Justice Fortas may, therefore, be decisive on this issue.
I might add that my own preference is for the Brennan view. I am not insensitlve to the difficulty of even believing that such a standard exists, let alone the difficulties in administering such a standard. But I cannot see that a book may be read in one community and not another; the First Amendment applies in Arkansas as well as in New York. My view is that if a book is not too offensive to be read by the residents of our great urban centers, it is not too offensive to be read by anyone else in the United States.
[123.] The only direct evidentiary references in the Supreme Court on community standards are to be found in the concurring opinions of Justices Frankfurter and Harlan in Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 160, 169 (1959). Mr. Justice Harlan's view is that "while a state is not debarred from regarding the trier of fact as the embodiment of community standards, competent to judge a challenged work against those standards, it is not privileged to rebuff all efforts to enlighten or persuade the trier." Id. at 172. The other point deserving of our comment is the refusal of the trial judge to permit defendant to introduce in evidence a large number of publications currently available in Rhode Island so that from them the jury could better form its opinion of community standards. It is, of course, true that what is sold in the market reflects to some extent community standards. But it is not true that every item sold is necessarily not obscene. Hence, not every book sold in the market is admissible to test the obscenity of Lust Job. Nor is a judge required to admit as a touchstone for the jury even those books which are admittedly not obscene. The admission of a number of different publications alleged to be comparable to the publication in issue might make the trial unmanageably complex and lengthy. The trial judge must be allowed wide discretion as to whether to permit the introduction of such allegedly comparable publications, and as to whether to allow the witnesses to be examined in detail on publications other than the one directly at issue. Here the trial judge did not abuse his discretion. In United States v. West Coast News Co., 357 F.2d 855, 860 (6th Cir. 1966) , the district judge permitted defendants to select eight other comparable books allegedly accepted by contemporary community standards. Only two of the proferred eight were found comparable, and they were denied admission for lack of proof that they were acceptable by community standardsl See also People v. Finkelstein, 11 N.Y.2d 300, 305, 183 N.E.2d 661, 663-64, 229 N.Y.S.2d 367, 371 (1962) . United States v. 1,000 Copies of Magazine Entitled "Solis," supra note 119.
[125.] On the federal level, at least, obscenity cannot be characterized simply as a question of law for the court, United States v. Luros, 243 F. Supp. 160 (D. Ia. 1963 ), or as a mixed question of law and fact to be submitted to the jury with instructions, Reed Enterprises v. Corcoran, 354 F.2d 519, 522 (D.C. Cir. 1965) . Each of the three obscenity criteria must be separately considered. Despite the Court's lack of direct attention to the problem, it seems apparent that the question of social value is for the court alone. To the extent that they are not treated as matters of judicial notice, prurient appeal and patent offensiveness are for the jury.
Vol. 76: 127, 1966
Ginzburg at Retail
The potential impact of the 1966 cases is also complicated by the fact that Ginzburg and Mishkin presented only one facet of the commercial exploitation of sex; they dealt with the suppression at the manufacturing, not the retail, stage of the business. Mr. Justice Brennan noted that manufacturers and distributors of erotica were not in any position to complain about the "residual vagueness" of obscenity.12o Whether they were or not, the same cannot be said of the retail seller, as Smith v. California'27 recognized. There the Court invalidated the conviction of a book seller under an ordinance prohibiting the sale of obscene books on the ground that scienter was not required. The Court left open what mental element would suffice, but it recognized that imposition of strict liability would have disastrous consequences.123 Smith suggests that the states either confine their prosecutions to manufacturers and distributors, or adopt a procedure comparable to the Massachusetts in rem proceedings against the book itself, which allows criminal proceedings against retailers only after the book is adjudged obscene. The great advantage of the Massachusetts procedure is that it eliminates the vagueness otherwise inherent in a prosecutory scheme. 2 9 Indeed, I was of the opinion that in rem proceedings were a constitutional requirement-part of the emerging First Amendment due process. Otherwise, fear of criminal prosecution would induce publishers and retailers to avoid the wide danger zone created by the definitional vagueness of obscenity. This self-censorship could deprive Attorney General requires that all obscenity actions begin under the in rem procedure.
The procedure is comparable to a criminal prosecution of a book publisher to the extent that the publisher is the principal-and generally the only-interienor in the action.
But there is the significant difference that if the book is held obscene, no criminal penalties are imposed, and retailers will be criminally prosecuted only for acti-ities after the book is adjudged obscene. The Massachusetts procedure is eminently desirable; it has the least possible impact on First Amendment interests. See AAss. Grx. L h, cli. 272, § § 28B-H, set out as an appendix to the opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan in Memoirs v. 
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